Friday, September 01, 2006
Sign here to stop plutonium fuel
Well, guess what. I now have cable internet service, which means I can put out useless information all the faster now. :-)
In truth, my dial-up was so slow that is became a burden to even try to do anything online. Perhaps I should have taken the hint, eh?
At any rate, this is my first post after getting faster service, so maybe I will be able to get more done now.
Here's the deal. Duke Power has agreed to use a blend of uranium (the "regular" radioactive stuff) and plutonium (the bomb stuff) and use it in our local power plants. I won't go into all the ins and outs of why this is a bad idea. Check out The Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League, the Nuclear Information and Resource Service or your favorite nuclear proliferation or environmental group to find out if ya just can't trust me. ~Grin~ Imagine that!
Nuclear Watch South and Greenpeace International have started a "sign on" letter to Rep. Hobson, which is below. They are seeking as many signatures as possible, and that includes you and any group you are associated with. If you can get your bowling league to sign on, please do!
All the details are below. No need to peek behind the "Read more!" link, as there is nothing there.
Sign on, forward, pass along, and generally spread the word please. My local frogs, who prefer two eyes to five, thank you!
Gregg
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
September x, 2006
Dear Representative Hobson
Chairman, House Energy and Water Development Subcommittee
Room 2362-B Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515-6020
fax 202-225-1984
Eliminate Funding for SRS MOX Plant, Support Plutonium Immobilization
Dear Representative Hobson:
We are writing to you to thank you for the decision by the Energy and Water Development Subcommittee which led the full House to eliminate funding for the plutonium fuel (mixed oxide fuel, MOX) plant at the Department of Energy¹s (DOE) Savannah River Site (SRS) in South Carolina. For a host of cost, non-proliferation, and environmental reasons we fully support the decision to terminate the MOX program as a method to deal with surplus weapons plutonium. We also enthusiastically applaud the House¹s recognition that immobilization of plutonium as waste is the preferred disposition path.
As you are well aware, after more than a decade of large expenditures and fiscal mismanagement, the DOE¹s MOX program has produced minimal results. As the cost of the MOX plant has rapidly accelerated to near $4 billion, the Energy and Water Development Subcommittee¹s decision to cease funding the MOX program will prevent costs from spiraling further out of control if construction of the MOX plant were to begin.
As has been confirmed by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB), the plutonium now stored in the old K-Reactor at SRS is too contaminated for use as MOX and must be immobilized in existing high-level waste. The subcommittee¹s substantial increase in funding for a revived plutonium immobilization program is timely and promises to yield positive results in disposing of surplus plutonium now stored at SRS, Hanford and other DOE sites.
The Russians have made it clear that they will not participate in a parallel program to use MOX in their light-water reactors (LWRs). Thus, the basis for the joint U.S.-Russian MOX program has collapsed. Along with termination of the MOX plant funding, we request that it be made very clear to DOE that construction of the MOX plant at SRS shall not go forward given that there is no longer a parallel program in Russia.
DOE is taking a new look at an ³all-immobilization option.² Immobilization yields positive environmental and non-proliferation benefits over the risky commercial plutonium fuel option because it involves less handling and processing of plutonium. It is obvious that immobilization would be much cheaper than the dual disposition track (MOX and immobilization) that DOE is now pursuing. At a recent House Armed Services hearing on plutonium, DOE presented unsubstantiated rough estimates for the cost of immobilization compared with the cost of a dual track. We request that Congress direct DOE to conduct an in-depth cost analysis, involving participation and review independent from DOE, on immobilization and all aspects of DOE¹s plutonium
disposition program. An important dimension of this report must be to review the wisdom of two plutonium programs being managed by two artificially separated entities inside DOE - the Office of Environmental Management and the National Nuclear Security Administration.
As DOE has clearly not given up on MOX, however, we ask you to keep in mind there remain huge obstacles to success with the U.S.-Russia MOX program. In addition to the long-standing unresolved liability issues and the equally long-standing lack of G-8 support for financing Russia¹s MOX infrastructure, Russia simply does not have reactor capacity to burn MOX fuel. Although Russia has said it would use its BN-600 plutonium breeder reactor for plutonium disposition, that aging reactor has a maximum capacity to use only 4-5 metric tons of plutonium during its remaining life, far under the 34 metric tons in the original U.S.-Russia agreement. Now Russia wants
outside funding to pay for construction of a massive new plutonium breeder reactor, the BN-800. That reactor simply does not exist and thus cannot satisfy the bilateral agreement. Further, the BN-800 can be operated in ³breeding² mode to produce yet more weapons-grade plutonium for the Russian stockpile. Given the expense and the stark proliferation risk such a reactor poses, the U.S. must reject this option outright.
To respond to this letter or if you have questions about plutonium disposition issues and/or concerns about the program in the SRS region, please contact Glenn Carroll, Nuclear Watch South, 404-378-4263, atom.girl@mindspring.com
We thank you very much for the significant step to terminate the MOX program. In the upcoming House-Senate conference committee we look to your leadership for a more sound and cost-effective approach to managing surplus plutonium.
Sincerely,
Glenn Carroll
Coordinator
Nuclear Watch South
(formerly GANE Georgians Against Nuclear Energy)
Atlanta, GA
Tom Clements
Senior Advisor
Greenpeace International
Washington, DC
Your Name
Your Title
Your Organization
City, State
In truth, my dial-up was so slow that is became a burden to even try to do anything online. Perhaps I should have taken the hint, eh?
At any rate, this is my first post after getting faster service, so maybe I will be able to get more done now.
Here's the deal. Duke Power has agreed to use a blend of uranium (the "regular" radioactive stuff) and plutonium (the bomb stuff) and use it in our local power plants. I won't go into all the ins and outs of why this is a bad idea. Check out The Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League, the Nuclear Information and Resource Service or your favorite nuclear proliferation or environmental group to find out if ya just can't trust me. ~Grin~ Imagine that!
Nuclear Watch South and Greenpeace International have started a "sign on" letter to Rep. Hobson, which is below. They are seeking as many signatures as possible, and that includes you and any group you are associated with. If you can get your bowling league to sign on, please do!
All the details are below. No need to peek behind the "Read more!" link, as there is nothing there.
Sign on, forward, pass along, and generally spread the word please. My local frogs, who prefer two eyes to five, thank you!
Gregg
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
September x, 2006
Dear Representative Hobson
Chairman, House Energy and Water Development Subcommittee
Room 2362-B Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515-6020
fax 202-225-1984
Eliminate Funding for SRS MOX Plant, Support Plutonium Immobilization
Dear Representative Hobson:
We are writing to you to thank you for the decision by the Energy and Water Development Subcommittee which led the full House to eliminate funding for the plutonium fuel (mixed oxide fuel, MOX) plant at the Department of Energy¹s (DOE) Savannah River Site (SRS) in South Carolina. For a host of cost, non-proliferation, and environmental reasons we fully support the decision to terminate the MOX program as a method to deal with surplus weapons plutonium. We also enthusiastically applaud the House¹s recognition that immobilization of plutonium as waste is the preferred disposition path.
As you are well aware, after more than a decade of large expenditures and fiscal mismanagement, the DOE¹s MOX program has produced minimal results. As the cost of the MOX plant has rapidly accelerated to near $4 billion, the Energy and Water Development Subcommittee¹s decision to cease funding the MOX program will prevent costs from spiraling further out of control if construction of the MOX plant were to begin.
As has been confirmed by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB), the plutonium now stored in the old K-Reactor at SRS is too contaminated for use as MOX and must be immobilized in existing high-level waste. The subcommittee¹s substantial increase in funding for a revived plutonium immobilization program is timely and promises to yield positive results in disposing of surplus plutonium now stored at SRS, Hanford and other DOE sites.
The Russians have made it clear that they will not participate in a parallel program to use MOX in their light-water reactors (LWRs). Thus, the basis for the joint U.S.-Russian MOX program has collapsed. Along with termination of the MOX plant funding, we request that it be made very clear to DOE that construction of the MOX plant at SRS shall not go forward given that there is no longer a parallel program in Russia.
DOE is taking a new look at an ³all-immobilization option.² Immobilization yields positive environmental and non-proliferation benefits over the risky commercial plutonium fuel option because it involves less handling and processing of plutonium. It is obvious that immobilization would be much cheaper than the dual disposition track (MOX and immobilization) that DOE is now pursuing. At a recent House Armed Services hearing on plutonium, DOE presented unsubstantiated rough estimates for the cost of immobilization compared with the cost of a dual track. We request that Congress direct DOE to conduct an in-depth cost analysis, involving participation and review independent from DOE, on immobilization and all aspects of DOE¹s plutonium
disposition program. An important dimension of this report must be to review the wisdom of two plutonium programs being managed by two artificially separated entities inside DOE - the Office of Environmental Management and the National Nuclear Security Administration.
As DOE has clearly not given up on MOX, however, we ask you to keep in mind there remain huge obstacles to success with the U.S.-Russia MOX program. In addition to the long-standing unresolved liability issues and the equally long-standing lack of G-8 support for financing Russia¹s MOX infrastructure, Russia simply does not have reactor capacity to burn MOX fuel. Although Russia has said it would use its BN-600 plutonium breeder reactor for plutonium disposition, that aging reactor has a maximum capacity to use only 4-5 metric tons of plutonium during its remaining life, far under the 34 metric tons in the original U.S.-Russia agreement. Now Russia wants
outside funding to pay for construction of a massive new plutonium breeder reactor, the BN-800. That reactor simply does not exist and thus cannot satisfy the bilateral agreement. Further, the BN-800 can be operated in ³breeding² mode to produce yet more weapons-grade plutonium for the Russian stockpile. Given the expense and the stark proliferation risk such a reactor poses, the U.S. must reject this option outright.
To respond to this letter or if you have questions about plutonium disposition issues and/or concerns about the program in the SRS region, please contact Glenn Carroll, Nuclear Watch South, 404-378-4263, atom.girl@mindspring.com
We thank you very much for the significant step to terminate the MOX program. In the upcoming House-Senate conference committee we look to your leadership for a more sound and cost-effective approach to managing surplus plutonium.
Sincerely,
Glenn Carroll
Coordinator
Nuclear Watch South
(formerly GANE Georgians Against Nuclear Energy)
Atlanta, GA
Tom Clements
Senior Advisor
Greenpeace International
Washington, DC
Your Name
Your Title
Your Organization
City, State
// posted by Gregg Jocoy @ 4:41 PM 
